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We investigate empirically how industrialized countries and U.S. states share consumption 
risk at horizons between one and thirty years. U.S. federal states share about 50 percent of 
their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross-state capital income flows. While insurance 
against transitory fluctuations in output is virtually complete, OECD countries do not share 
any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Our results suggest that purely transaction cost 
based theories cannot explain the home bias, since the potential welfare gains from insurance 
against permanent shocks would by far outweigh that of insuring against transitory variation. 
We conclude that permanent and transitory shocks constitute two qualitatively different kinds 
of risk and that various forms of endogenous market incompleteness may render permanent 
shocks a lot harder to insure, in particular at the international level. 
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 1 Introduction
International non-diversiﬁcation is one of the big puzzles of international
ﬁnance. Starting with French and Poterba (1991), the literature documents
that countries’ equity portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets.
This portfolio home bias puzzle ﬁnds its natural correspondence in the lack
of international consumption risk sharing:1 countries share a lot less of their
idiosyncratic consumption risk than do regions within a country.
To understand the sources of this lack of international consumption risk
sharing, it is important to identify in which way countries and regions achieve
the degree of consumption insurance that we see in the data. Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996), henceforth ASY, have suggested a simple de-
composition of output risk that allows to distinguish between two important
channels through which risk can be shared:
First, countries or regions can pool their risks by exchanging claims to
their output, say in the form of equity or through ﬁscal transfer arrangements.
Since the claims to output are exchanged before uncertainty is resolved, we
call this the ex ante channel of risk sharing. The cross holdings of claims to
each others’ output then induce income ﬂows that allow countries to stabilize
their income in the face of output shocks. ASY therefore also refer to the ex
ante channel as income smoothing.
Second, a country or region can further smooth its consumption through
the sale or purchase of foreign assets or through borrowing and lending. Since
this entails that current income is already observed and uncertainty about
outputs is already resolved, we call this the ex post channel of risk sharing.2
ASY and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), henceforth SY, ﬁnd that the main
source of the lack of international consumption risk sharing is that countries
do almost not share any risk ex ante whereas U.S. federal states share 50
percent (inclusive of ﬁscal transfers) of their consumption risk in this way.
Conversely, both U.S. federal states as well as OECD countries are surpris-
ingly similar with respect to the amount of insurance they achieve ex post.3
1This lack of consumption risk sharing is documented in a slightly separate literature:
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) demonstrated that international consumption corre-
lations are too low to be explained by models with perfect capital mobility and complete
asset markets.
2The two channels can be distinguished along one other important dimension: risk
averse agents will want to avoid variability ex ante, even in an atemporal economy. Ex
ante sharing of risk therefore only entails income ﬂows in the cross-section of of countries.
A further smoothing of consumption ex post, however, only makes sense in a multi-period
world. We therefore also use the words cross-sectional and inter-temporal channel for the
ex ante and the ex post channels respectively.
3M´ elitz and Zumer (1999) extended the ASY study by including further exogenous
1What the literature so far has not answered is to what extent these ﬁnd-
ings depend on the forecasting horizon. The relative role of the channels as
well as the total amount of insurance achieved is likely to vary as we change
the forecasting horizon. Identifying the time proﬁle of the contribution of
channels to the total amount of risk sharing may give us further important
indications as to the frictions that are important in international ﬁnancial
markets.
In this paper, we therefore extend the method of ASY (1996) to a fully
dynamic framework.4 We use data from industrialised countries as well as
from U.S. federal states to evaluate the contribution of ex ante and ex post
risk sharing to consumption insurance at diﬀerent horizons. Our method also
allows us to identify permanent and transitory shocks and to ask whether
they get insured through diﬀerent channels.
The distinction between permanent and transitory shocks is of paramount
importance for understanding the sources of the home bias. First, most
economic theories would associate the permanent and transitory parts of
output with diﬀerent types of economic shocks: typically, permanent shocks
are associated with the supply side, whereas the transitory or business cycle
part is associated with demand side shocks. Secondly, and more importantly,
permanent and transitory shocks may constitute very diﬀerent kinds of risk
in terms of their insurability in ﬁnancial markets: consumption cannot be
smoothed ex post in the face of permanent shocks but can only be insured ex
ante. Insurance against permanent shocks therefore requires a more elaborate
asset market structure in which state-contingent assets such as e.g. equity
are traded, whereas consumption smoothing in the face of transitory shocks
can be achieved with simple assets such as loans and bonds (see Baxter and
Crucini (1995)).
Before we proceed to present our econometric model and the data, we
provide a preview of our results:
1. U.S. federal states share roughly one half of their idiosyncratic risk ex
ante, whereas there is virtually no ex ante insurance at the international
level. The contribution of the ex ante channel is roughly constant over
time in both data sets. Also, the amount of ex post risk sharing achieved
is about the same in both data sets but declines from about 30 to 40
percent in the short run to generally less than ten percent at horizons
variables like regional size and the real interest rate. Their results by and large corroborate
those of ASY.
4Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) provide an analysis of risk-sharing at various
time horizons but their model does not allow the identiﬁcation of risk-sharing channels.
2of 15 years and beyond, implying that the relative lack of international
consumption risk sharing worsens in the long run.
2. The second important result of our paper is that the apparent lack
of international consumption insurance is in fact a failure to insure
against permanent ﬂuctuations whereas insurance against transitory
shocks seems almost complete. At ﬁrst sight, this seems to constitute a
puzzle: for a given marginal cost of transacting in international ﬁnan-
cial markets, economic agents would rather insure against permanent
shocks. In particular, our ﬁnding seems inconsistent with theories in
which ﬁxed transaction costs are put forward as a possible explanation
of the home bias.5
Rather, we suggest the following interpretation of our results: perma-
nent and transitory shocks constitute two qualitatively diﬀerent kinds
of risk and various forms of endogenous market incompleteness may
render permanent shocks a lot harder to insure, in particular at the
international level. If the state of the world cannot be ascertained at
all or if it is very costly to do so, problems of moral hazard may limit
the enforceability of certain contracts. This problem is more perti-
nent for state-contingent assets rather than non-state contingent ones,
such as bonds. Because permanent variation in relative output and in-
come levels can be insured only through state-contingent assets, it may
be harder for regions and countries alike to insure against permanent
shocks.6
3. The empirical literature on consumption risk-sharing is based on re-
gressions of variables such as country-speciﬁc consumption and income
on endowment variables, notably output. The maintained assumption
in all of these studies is that ﬂuctuations in output are exogenous. If,
however, consumption and output are incidentally correlated for rea-
sons other than market incompleteness, then this could in principle
5While our results could be qualitatively consistent with ﬁxed transaction costs that
diﬀer across asset classes (such as equity and bonds), the welfare gains from insuring
against permanent risk seem to dwarf those to be had by insuring against risks at the
business cycle frequency (compare e.g. the calculations in van Wincoop (1999) to those
in Lucas (1987)). Transaction costs would therefore have to vary enormously across asset
classes in order to provide some leverage in explaining our results quantitatively. Since
turnover in international equity positions is quite high (Tesar and Werner (1995)), we do
not believe that this is the case.
6At a theoretical level, this mechanism has ﬁrst been suggested by Kocherlakota (1996).
Kehoe and Perri (2002) explore the mechanism quantitatively in a calibrated general
equilibrium framework and ﬁnd that it can account for the low consumption correlations
observed in international data.
3lead to wrong inference with respect to the amount of international
consumption risk sharing. As an additional result this paper provides
evidence based on principal components analysis that shows that shocks
to output are the predominant source of variability in standard data
sets.7
We structure our analysis as follows:
Section two outlines our econometric approach. Our main way of estimat-
ing risk-sharing patterns at various horizons is by means of a cointegrated
panel vector autoregression. By exploiting equilibrium relations between the
data, we can identify permanent and transitory shocks to output with only
minimal identifying assumptions. Section three describes the data and our
empirical strategy. We report the results of our analysis in section four and
oﬀer more discussion and a summary of conclusions in section ﬁve.
2 A dynamic model of risk sharing
In this section we propose a dynamic econometric model that enables us to
analyse how income risk is shared over time. Our decomposition is based on
the work by ASY. Crucini (1999) has oﬀered a formal justiﬁcation for this
decomposition and we brieﬂy summarize it here:
In a world in which cross-border ownership of assets is possible, a coun-






t + (1 ¡ ¸)Y
k
t (1)
where Y and Y ¤ denote home and foreign per capita output respectively and
INC is country or region k’s income. The coeﬃcient ¸ measures the degree
of diversiﬁcation of country or region k. Through diversiﬁcation, the region
will generally achieve some income smoothing. We will refer to this notion
of income smoothing as ex ante risk sharing because it requires that the
international portfolio weight ¸ has to be set before Y and Y ¤ are observed.
7This ﬁnding is also consistent with the results of other researchers: Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992) discuss a model in which country-speciﬁc productivity shocks gener-
ate asymmetric ﬂuctuations in labor input because labor is not mobile between countries.
If utility is non-separable in consumption and leisure, this may lead to a positive correla-
tion in relative output and relative consumption although ﬁnancial markets are complete.
But the results in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland also show that such a mechanism cannot
quantitatively rationalize the consumption correlation puzzle. Our,empirical, results point
in the same direction.
4Optimal consumption in country k will generally be smoother than in-
come because consumption should react only to the permanent level of in-
come. Therefore, further smoothing will generally take place and we refer to
this as consumption smoothing or risk sharing ex post.
The covariance of the relative8 income-output ratio with relative output
can therefore be thought of as a measure of ex ante risk sharing. In the
same mould, the covariance of the relative income-consumption ratio with
relative output measures ex post risk sharing. This is the decomposition
suggested in ASY (1996). This paper develops a fully dynamic version of the
ASY decomposition.9 Our objective is to characterize the joint uncertainty
of relative output, income and consumption at diﬀerent forecasting horizons.
To this end, we decompose the k period ahead mean squared prediction error
of per capita output conditional on information available at time t:
var(yt+kjIt) = var(yt+k ¡ Et(yt+k))
where E (¢) is the expectations operator and It is the information set that
is available as of time t. We now write this conditional variance as
var(yt+kjIt) = cov(yt+k ¡ inct+k;yt+kjIt) (2)
+cov(inct+k ¡ ct+k;yt+kjIt)
+cov(ct+k;yt+kjIt)
We can divide (2) by var(yt+kjIt) to get:
1 = ¯K(k) + ¯C(k) + ¯U(k)
8We use the term ‘relative to the rest of the World’ as equivalent to ‘idiosyncratic’ and
mean the logarithmic or percentage deviation from the world (or country) aggregate. To
save on notation, we denote relative variables with lower-case letters, so relative output is
y = log Y
Y ¤, relative income is inc = log INC
INC¤, and relative consumption is c = log C
C¤
9Our analysis here focuses on the distinction between ex ante and ex post insurance and
we do not distinguish a ﬁscal insurance channel. Given that most ﬁscal transfer schemes
are based on rules that were written ex ante, we would tend to include this channel into
the ex ante channel. A closer analysis of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this
paper.
For a survey of the literature on ﬁscal risk sharing see von Hagen (2000) who also provides
a number of theoretical explanations for the generally limited extent of ﬁscal risk sharing
found in the data. At the international level, SY (1998) have demonstrated that the ﬁscal




















Throughout the paper, we refer to the vector sequence ¯(k)k=1;2::: as
dynamic risk sharing proﬁle. For given k, the elements of the vector ¯(k)
can be interpreted as the coeﬃcients in regressions of the form
(yt+k ¡ inct+k) ¡ Et [yt+k ¡ inct+k] = ¯K(k)(yt+k ¡ Et [yt+k]) + ut+k (4a)
(inct+k ¡ ct+k) ¡ Et [inct+k ¡ ct+k] = ¯C(k)(yt+k ¡ Et [yt+k]) + vt+k (4b)
ct+k ¡ Et [ct+k] = ¯U(k)(yt+k ¡ Et [yt+k]) + wt+k (4c)
and this setting also allows us to associate them with the various channels
of risk sharing. We call the set of equations (4) the ‘risk sharing regressions’.
Clearly, in the empirical implementation, only two of the three equations will
have to be estimated, since the coeﬃcients of ¯(k) will always add to unity.
The y ¡inc diﬀerential reﬂects international factor income ﬂows. Hence,
¯K(k) measures to what extent capital income from abroad shields GNP
(income) from variation in GDP (output). Therefore, ¯K(k) can be thought
of as representing the ex ante, cross-sectional or income-smoothing dimension
of consumption insurance that is achieved (primarily) through cross-border
or cross-regional ownership of assets.10
The inc¡c diﬀerential measures savings and ¯C(k) gives the contribution
of the ex post, intertemporal or consumption smoothing channel of insurance
at horizon k. Finally, ¯U(k) is the residual covariance between consump-
tion growth and output growth, reﬂecting the undiversiﬁed or unsmoothed
component of consumption.
2.1 Estimating risk sharing proﬁles
There are in principle two ways of implementing equations (4) empirically.
The ﬁrst is what we call the regression-based approach. It amounts to re-
placing the expectation terms by observable variables and then to estimate
¯(k) from a regression. The most straightforward way of substituting for the
10At the international level, SY (1998) demonstrate that labour income ﬂows between
industrialised countries are negligible. The same holds true for interest payments on
international bonds and loans. We can therefore think of the GDP-GNP diﬀerential as a
good proxy for contingent capital income such as equity returns.
6expectation terms is by the value as of time t of the respective variable. This
amounts to diﬀerencing the data at horizon k. ASY and SY use this simple
method to provide preliminary evidence on risk sharing a various horizons.
To set the scene, we will also present some regression-based evidence this
paper. Speciﬁcally, we will report the results from diﬀerenced regressions at
horizon k = 1. Since this just amounts to the original ASY speciﬁcation, we
call this set of regressions the ‘ASY regressions’. We associate the vector of
coeﬃcients from the ASY regressions with risk sharing in the short run or at






To obtain a regression-based characterization of long-run risk sharing, we
run the risk sharing regressions in levels rather than diﬀerences, i.e. in (4) we
drop the expectation terms and then estimate the respective regression. This
amounts to an estimate of the unconditional covariation between the levels
of relative output, income and consumption and can therefore be thought as
a proxy of ¯(k) as k tends to inﬁnity.11 We label the corresponding vector






The second way to implement (4) is to go for a full charaterization of
all moments of output, income and consumption by means of a VAR. This
VAR-based approach is the solution we advocate in this paper. It oﬀers a
number of advantages over the regression-based approach.
First and most importantly, a VAR allows us to identify permanent and
transitory shocks and to obtain separate dynamic risk sharing proﬁles for
each of these types of shocks.12 Clearly, this would not be possible within
a regression-based approach. As we have argued earlier, the separate risk
sharing proﬁles for permanent and transitory shocks are meant to give us
important indications as to the potential sources of the home bias. Our
identiﬁcation of permanent and transitory shocks comes naturally in a VAR
context since economic theory imposes a cointegrating restriction on the data:
in the long-run the average country’s consumption must equal its income.
A second advantage of the VAR is that it provides a complete description
of the moments of the data at all leads and lags. Hence, the dynamic risk
sharing proﬁle is a closed-form function of the VAR parameters. If we were
to obtain an estimate of the risk sharing proﬁle from a sequence of regression
equations diﬀerenced at horizon k = 1;2:::, the analytic link between the
diﬀerent ¯(k) for k = 1;2::: would remain blurred. Note also that, since
11Such level regressions could be spurious as pure time series regressions since they
involve unit root processes that are not cointegrated. In a panel, however, the level risk
sharing regressions are well-deﬁned as long-run relations in the sense of Phillips and Moon
(1999). In section 3 we discuss how we estimate the level regressions.
12We refer to the dynamic risk sharing proﬁle associated with the permanent shocks as
¯P(k) and to the one associated with transitory shocks as ¯T(k).
7diﬀerencing amounts to substituting Et(xt+k) ¼ xt (where x stands for any
of the variables in (4)), we would implicitly assume that the data are well
approximated by random walks. This approximation can be problematic: if
xt has a transitory component, its changes will be predictable, at least over
shorter horizons.
Third, for our purposes, the VAR also oﬀers advantages over diﬀerenced
or ‘long horizon’ regressions in terms of estimation: the diﬀerenced regression
can either be estimated with overlapping or with non-overlapping observa-
tions. If non-overlapping observations are used, there are fewer and fewer
observations as k increases in relation to the sample size. This may lead
to estimation ineﬃciency and considerable small sample distortions, which
is particularly disturbing in the context of our analysis since one of our
main objectives is to gauge the relative role of the channels in the long-run.
Alternatively, with overlapping observations, the residuals will be serially
correlated and the estimation procedure will then have to correct for this in
a more or less ad hoc manner.13 In our view it is preferable to model the
patterns of temporal (and cross equation) dependence head on by using a
VAR. 14 Since the VAR treats all variables symetrically as endogenous, we
also minimize the risk of simultaneity bias in ¯(k) that may arise if rela-
tive output, income and consumption are correlated for reasons other than
market incompleteness.15
The remainder of this section discusses the implementation of (4) using
a (panel) VAR and the identiﬁcation of permanent and transitory shocks. It
contains some technical material which can be skipped by those readers who
only have a general or cursory interest in our results.
13Even after correcting for serial correlation in the errors, the small sample distortions
of long-horizon regressions can be quite considerable, as recent research in this area has
shown (see e.g. Valkanov (2003) and Coe and Nason (2004)). While it is often argued that
long-horizon regressions may carry important power gains over, say, a VAR approach, a
recent study by Valkanov (2003) casts doubt on this conclusion.
14Hodrick (1992) also advocates the VAR as a robust method to estimate parameters
such as ¯(k).
15Clearly, this can only be true for k > 1. In annual data there are many plausible
reasons why consumption and income could still be coincidentally correlated with output.
A crucial presumption of the ASY approach is that output is the exogenous source of
shocks, whereas income and consumption are not systematically subject to independent
variation. There is no direct way to test this assumption. Still, if the ASY presumption
is correct, then shocks to the system should predominantly originate in output, whereas
income and consumption should not by themselves be an important source of shocks. We
further explore this issue below.
82.2 Dynamic risk sharing proﬁles in a VAR
In this and the following subsections we now discuss the technical issues
involved in estimating dynamic risk sharing proﬁles and in the identiﬁcation
of permanent and transitory shocks.
We ﬁrst discuss, how the risk sharing proﬁle ¯(k) can be completely
characterized from a VAR. We then consider how a simple country- or re-
gional budget constraint (in the long run, income and consumption have to
be equal) imposes a cointegrating restriction that can then be exploited to
identify permanent and transitory shocks which will also allow us to obtain
¯P(k) and ¯T(k).










We assume that only the past of Xt enters the information set, so that
It = fX¿g
t
¿=1 and that expectations coincide with linear projections. These
assumptions allow us to form E(XtjIt¡1) by projecting Xt on its own past.
Hence, Xt has a vector autoregressive (VAR) representation of the form
Φ(L)Xt = ²t (5)
where Φ(L) is a 3 £ 3 matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L, which
satisﬁes the condition that the roots of det(Φ(z)) lie on or outside the unit
circle. Note that we explicitly allow Xt to have unit roots and to be poten-
tially cointegrated, which will be important in our empirical implementation.
The unexpected component of Xt is given by ²t = Xt¡Et¡1(Xt) and reﬂects
the one-period ahead forecast error.
Now let Ω denote the variance-covariance matrix of ²t and let !ij be the
entry in the i-th row and j-th column of Ω. Then, given the ordering of the
variables in Xt , the elements of Ω are just
!11 = var(ytjIt¡1)
!21 = cov(yt ¡ inct;ytjIt¡1)
!31 = cov(inct ¡ ct;ytjIt¡1)








9and ¯U(1) is given by
¯U(1) = 1 ¡ ¯K(1) ¡ ¯C(1) (7)
In order to generalize our approach to arbitrary forecast horizons, we need
a description of the data dynamics. This description is given by the VAR in
(5) so that for k > 1, the coeﬃcients of ¯(k) will not only be functions of Ω
but also of the VAR coeﬃcients.
We note that the reduced form residual matrix Ω represents the mean-
squared prediction error of the VAR one period ahead. We therefore also
write Ω(1) instead of Ω. More generally, we denote with Ω(k) the k-period
mean squared prediction error of Xt. Whereas Ω(1) is a parameter of the
VAR, for k > 1, Ω(k) is a function of Ω(1) and the VAR coeﬃcients. Very
much as ¯(1) is given by ratios of the entries of Ω(1), so ¯(k) will then be
deﬁned by the elements of Ω(k).
To obtain a general analytic expression for Ω(k) we recognize that by the
assumptions on the VAR in (5) Xt is diﬀerence stationary. Hence, there is a
Wold representation of ∆Xt
∆Xt = C(L)²t
where C(L) is an inﬁnite-order MA matrix polynomial. Then we can
express the prediction error of ∆Xt+k




This allows us to write the mean squared prediction error Ω(k) of the
level variable Xt as




[∆Xt+l ¡ Et (∆Xt+l)]
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Now let the entries of Ω(k) be denoted by !ij(k). Then, in analogy to









¯U(k) = 1 ¡ ¯K(k) ¡ ¯C(k):
2.3 Cointegration, permanent and transitory shocks
Relative output, income and consumption are likely to be integrated pro-
cesses. In the (levels) VAR speciﬁcation (5) we have allowed for this pos-
sibility as well as for the possibility of cointegration between the variables.
Indeed, our model imposes a cointegrating restriction on the data: ex ante
risk sharing may decouple a country’s or region’s output from its income,
but in the long run, ex post income and consumption will have to be equal.
By the permanent income hypothesis, consumption should correspond to the







t + (1 ¡ ¸)Y
kP
t (11)
where the superscript ‘P’ denotes the permanent component.
Because world income and output coincide and because the consumption










Taking logarithms on both sides, we ﬁnd that relative (log) consumption




In an open economy with risk-sharing, consumption should follow the per-
manent level of income, after all transfers that arise through (cross-sectional,
i.e. ex ante) risk sharing (see Crucini (1999)). We note that this cointegrat-
ing relationship between c and inc is independent of how much ex ante risk
sharing is achieved through international portfolio diversiﬁcation.16
Johansen (1995) has shown that the presence of a stationary variable in a
vector of otherwise integrated series implies a cointegration restriction with





. Indeed, panel unit root tests based on Im, Pe-
saran and Shin (2003) suggested that inc¡c is stationary in both data sets.
16Strictly speaking, a country could increase its foreign asset position through capital
gains so that (relative) income and consumption can diverge forever. We do not think
that this extreme is case is relevant - certainly not for the ’representative’ country or state
that is modelled by our panel approach.
11According to Granger’s representation theorem, our level VAR model in (5)
therefore has an error correction representation of the form
Γ(L)∆Xt = °±
0Xit¡1 + ²t (12)




represents the vector of adjustment coeﬃcients. The short-run dynamic ad-
justment coeﬃcients Γ(L) is implicitly deﬁned by the expansion of the VAR
lag-polynomial Φ(L) = Φ(1) + Γ(L)(1 ¡ L).
The presence of cointegration in our model allows the identiﬁcation of
permanent and transitory shocks without any further identifying assump-
tions: our system is trivariate with one cointegrating relationship. Hence,
there are two permanent shocks that represent the innovations to the two
common trends (Stock and Watson (1988)) and one transitory disturbance.
Expanding C(L) = C(1) + C¤(L)(1 ¡ L), and cumulating the moving aver-







Johansen (1995), showed that the long-run response matrix C(1) of a








where the subscript ‘?’ denotes the orthogonal complement of the respec-





where, in our case with two common trends, A = ¯?(°0
?Φ(1)¡1¯?)¡1 is
3£2 and the (2£1)-vector °0
?²t represents the innovations to the unit-root





Finally, the presence of one cointegrating relationship also implies that
there is a purely transitory shock ¿t that does not have a long-run impact
on any of the components of Xt. Following Johansen (1995), this shock is
12identiﬁed by requiring that it is orthogonal to °0





We note that this identiﬁcation is purely based on one single restriction
that is implied by our theoretical framework: consumption is determined by
the permanent level of ex post income. This is why relative consumption
and relative income will be cointegrated. Therefore, the variables in our
trivariate VAR speciﬁcation must be subject to two permanent shocks and
one transitory shock.
This cointegrated setup now allows us to identify the variance contribu-
tions of permanent and transitory shocks to output that we need as the basis
for the computation of the separate risk sharing proﬁles for permanent and
transitory shocks. One important feature of a cointegrated system is that
the relative variance contribution of permanent and transitory shocks are in-
dependent of how the permanent and transitory shocks are identiﬁed among
themselves: our model has two permanent shocks that are given by the two-
dimensional vector ¼t. Any mapping S¼¼ with a non-singular S¼ will also
identify a set of permanent shocks. If we were to conduct impulse response
analysis, we would therefore need to orthogonalize the elements of ¼t using a
priori restrictions on S¼. This would require that we impose just-identifying
restrictions. However, there is no need to do so if all we are interested in is in
identifying the contribution of ¼t to the variance of Xt (and there notably:
output).

































Both ΩP(k) and ΩT(k) are independent of S¼ and S¿, i.e. of any par-
ticular rotation of permanent or transitory shocks. This is a very desirable
property of our procedure. One major shortcoming of structural VAR anal-
ysis is that it requires the researcher to impose non-testable just-identifying
restrictions. In our setting, economic theory provides one cointegrating rela-
tionship that fully identiﬁes the relative importance of permanent and tran-
sitory shocks for the variation in output.
13Once we have obtained estimates of ΩP(k) and ΩT(k) it is then straight-
forward to obtain the corresponding risk sharing proﬁles ¯P(k) and ¯T(k)
in analogy to (10) above.
3 Data and Empirical Implementation
Our international data are from OECD National Accounts Main Aggregates
volume 1, OECD Economic Outlook, period 1960-1996. Gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), gross national product (GNP) and household ﬁnal consumption
expenditure (C) are all deﬂated using the consumer price index and trans-
formed into per capita data by using population data from the same source.
The U.S. regional data are the data used in ASY and were downloaded
from Oved Yosha’s webpage. They consist of gross-state product and per-
sonal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and range
from 1963-1990. Personal consumption data at the state level is not avail-
able. ASY have therefore used retail sales data. Unfortunately, retail sales
are only a part of total personal consumption, so in order to obtain an es-
timate of total personal consumption, ASY re-scaled the retail sales data
by the ratio of aggregate U.S. private consumption to aggregate U.S. retail
sales. Finally, state and local government consumption is added to obtain
state consumption.
To account for the potential role of global (or U.S. wide) shocks (time-
speciﬁc eﬀects) that may create uninsurable output variability, we formulated
the data for each country (or state) relative to the global (or U.S. wide) ag-
gregate. In the setup of the panel, we multiplied the data of each country by
its population weight. ASY (1996) have emphasized that measurement error
may be present in U.S. state level data. To alleviate estimation problems,
they suggested to weight the regressions with the state-speciﬁc variance. We
follow this practice here.
As a ﬁrst step, we estimate the original ASY regressions, i.e. we regress
∆y ¡ ∆inc and ∆c on ∆y by OLS. We control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects by removing country-speciﬁc means from all variables. To obtain a
regression-based measure of risk sharing in the long-run, we also estimate
the same regressions in levels, i.e. y ¡ inc and c on y. As discussed earlier,
this regression could be spurious in time series, but it describes a panel long-
run relation in the sense of Phillips and Moon (1999). To account for the
possible endogeneity of the regressors, we employ the panel dynamic OLS
prodecure (PDOLS) suggested by Mark and Sul (2004), including one lead
and lag respectively of ∆y. Again, we remove country-speciﬁc means.
Then, we proceeded to the main exercise, the panel estimation of the
14vector autoregression (5). We follow the procedure proposed by Holtz-Eakin,
Newey and Rosen (1988) that we explain in much detail in the technical
appendix. We obtained both unconditional estimates as well as estimates
based on the permanent-transitory decomposition described above.17
We are not aware of a generally accepted procedure for selecting the lag
length in a panel VAR. We ﬁrst explored standard information criteria. These
would generally indicate a short lag length of one or two periods, which we
think is very plausible, given that our data is of annual frequency. As we will
see in the following section, using one or two lags throughout also leads to
values of ¯(k) for large k that are close to the estimates of ¯LR obtained from
the levels regressions. Since both ¯LRand ¯(k)k!1 approximate the long-run
covariance structure of Xt, this provides an additional check of plausibility
on the choice of lag length.
4 Results
In the selection of countries we used for our investigation, we deliberately
only included OECD economies. This ensures that countries are suﬃciently
homogenous to warrant treatment in a single panel estimation. Our panel of
countries also includes several interesting sub-groupings and we will report
results for these throughout. These sub-groups include a core of OECD
countries (the G7 economies plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland and Sweden). This grouping is also studied in Sørensen and Yosha
(1998) and serves as a reference group. We also study the G7 as a separate
subgrouping, as well as the European Union of 15 countries before the 2004
enlargement (EU15). Another group of countries we explore are the starting
members of the EMU as of January 1999 to which we refer as EMU11. In
all exercises that we are going to present in this section, we compare the
outcome from the analysis of international data to the results from the U.S.
state-level data set.
4.1 Regression-based evidence
To set the scene, we run the ASY decomposition on both data sets and all
subgroups of countries. We also present the results from the level (long run)
risk sharing regressions. Table 1 provides an overview of this ﬁrst set results.
For the short run (column 1), our ﬁndings are very similar to those reported
17As a robustness check of the homogeneity assumption underlying the panel VAR, we
used a ‘mean group estimator’ as suggested in Pesaran and Smith (1995), with very similar
results.




OECD ¯K 0.01 (0.007) -0.02 (0.103)
¯C 0.36 (0.010) 0.11 (0.143)
OECD core ¯K -0.01 (0.003) -0.03 (0.047)
¯C 0.36 (0.014) 0.06 (0.178)
G7 ¯K 0.01 (0.002) 0.00 (0.045)
¯C 0.29 (0.015) 0.08 (0.204)
EU15 ¯K 0.05 (0.014) -0.02 (0.171)
¯C 0.42 (0.017) 0.11 (0.192)
EMU11 ¯K 0.06 (0.026) 0.04 (0.229)
¯C 0.43 (0.028) 0.18 (0.233)
U.S. states ¯K 0.58 (0.017) 0.67 (0.116)
¯C 0.28 (0.026) -0.16 (0.174)
Source: OECD National Accounts Main Aggregates volume 1, OECD Economic Outlook,
period 1960-1996. ‘OECD’ refers to all 1996 members except Mexico and Turkey. ‘OECD
core’ denotes the G7 plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.
‘EU15’ refers to all 15 EU members as of 1996. ‘EMU 11’ comprises the eleven starting
members of EMU.
Values in parentheses are standard errors. Those for the long run are corrected for serial
correlation in the residuals and for simultaneity.
in both ASY (1996) and SY (1998): while in international data generally
more than 60 percent of idiosyncratic output variation remain uninsured,
this is the case for only about 15 percent in U.S. state level data. While
the total contribution of the intertemporal channel is between 30 and 40
percent in both data sets, there is a lot more ex ante risk sharing in U.S.
data.18 Table 1, column 2 shows long run estimates obtained with the PDOLS
procedure explained above. A very interesting pattern emerges: the role of
the ex post channel declines very markedly in all country groupings as well
as for the United States. But for the U.S., the ex ante channel continues
to contribute substantially to risk sharing. We ﬁnd that roughly two thirds
of all long run output risk among U.S. federal states is shared ex ante. For
groups of countries, the role of the ex ante channel remains very tiny. But
18Qualitatively, our results are the same as ASY. Slight diﬀerences in point estimates
are due to the fact that we do plain OLS estimation while ASY do GLS.
16generally, both the ex ante and ex post channels are found to be insigniﬁcant
in international data, suggesting that idiosyncratic output risk is not shared
internationally in the long-run. Almost all risk sharing between countries
takes place as consumption smoothing ex post and it is limited to shorter
horizons.
4.2 Risk sharing proﬁles from the VAR
To analyze this evidence in more detail and to understand how the relative
role of the channels changes over time, we now turn to the risk sharing proﬁles
that we estimated from the cointegrated panel VAR. Table 2 provides the
relative contributions of the intertemporal and the cross-sectional channels
at forecast horizons of one, three, ﬁve, ten, ﬁfteen and thirty years. The
general impression from table 1 is conﬁrmed: ﬁrst of all, countries share a lot
less risk ex ante than do U.S. federal states. This holds true at all horizons.
Generally the contribution of the ex ante channel does not change very much
over time. But the role of the ex post channel declines very markedly. Still,
at the maximum forecast horizon of 30 years that we report here, the role of
the ex post channel is generally signiﬁcant in international data, in contrast
to the ﬁndings in table 1. The VECM model uses additional information on
the cointegrating properties of the data that is not possible to incorporate
into the levels risk sharing regression: a country’s consumption will have
to equal its income in the long-run. This restriction limits the uncertainty
surrounding the prediction of future consumption levels relative to output
and forces the long- run contribution of the ex post channel to be zero.19
19The long-run covariance matrix of Xt, Ω1 = limk!1 Ω(k)=k = C(1)ΩC(1)0 is of
reduced rank. In particular, the third row and column of Ω1 contain only zeros. Small
biases in the estimation of the VAR parameters may induce very slow convergence of P
Cl to C(1). Hence Ω(k) will not be numerically close to singularity, even for very large
k. This could lead to the spurious conclusion that the ex post channel contributes to risk
sharing at all horizons. To avoid this problem, we express Cl in terms of the parameters of
the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, so that
Pk
0 Cl = C(1)+C¤
k in (9). We then use the
closed-form representation C(1) = ¯?(°0
?Φ(1)¡1¯?)¡1°0
? and truncate the expansion of
C¤






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Against the backdrop of these remarks, the results obtained from table
1 and table 2 are remarkably consistent. We therefore summarize this ﬁrst
part of our empirical analysis by concluding that countries insure a lot less
than do states within the U.S. and this is true at all uncertainty horizons.
For both the U.S. and the international data sets we ﬁnd that ex post risk
sharing becomes less important over time. Clearly, this reﬂects the fact that
in the long run, a country’s consumption must equal its income so that a
smoothing of permanent shocks ex post is not possible. However, U.S. federal
states continue to share a sizeable portion of their long-run idiosyncratic risk
ex ante.
The proﬁle of risk sharing at various time horizons allows us to draw a
more precise picture of how countries or regions achieve risk sharing while
maintaining the simplicity and elegance of the ASY decomposition. In par-
ticular, we can now study how permanent and transitory shocks get insured.
Before we do so in the next sub-section, we discuss one important presump-
tion of the ASY-approach and relate our ﬁrst results to the earlier literature.
A novelty of our paper is that we use a fully-ﬂedged dynamic economet-
ric speciﬁcation to study the time-proﬁle of risk sharing. The results from
the dynamic speciﬁcation so far are qualitatively consistent with those we
obtained from the regression-based speciﬁcations and that were reported in
table 1. At intermediate horizons, they are also in line with earlier results
by other researchers. Using the ‘diﬀerencing cum regression’ method, SY
(1998) ﬁnd that the unsmoothed component at the three-years horizon is
somewhat larger (roughly 75 percent) than at the 1-year horizon (roughly
60 percent). In a similar way, Canova and Ravn (1996) report that lower
frequency ﬂuctuations in income seem less insured than higher frequency
ﬂuctuations in international data. Our results are in line with these ﬁndings:
the contribution of the intertemporal channel is a lot lower in the long-run
but the message from the dynamic proﬁles is also that it decreases very
slowly. At business cycle frequencies, and actually far beyond, the ex post
channel generally continues to play an important role, indicating that shocks
of remarkable degrees of persistence can be smoothed ex post.
The VAR-based approach presented in this paper allows us to examine
an important assumption that underlies the ASY-approach: if the output-
income diﬀerential and the income-consumption diﬀerential actually serve as
buﬀers for shocks to output, they should be driven by exactly the same shocks
that drive output. In other words: the notion underlying ASY and the related
literature is that shocks originate in output ﬂuctuations and get smoothed at
various levels. But the various aggregates, i.e. the Y-INC diﬀerential and the
INC-C diﬀerential that act as buﬀers, should not themselves be the source
of shocks.
19We explore this assumption by conducting a principal components anal-
ysis of the shocks to our econometric model. If the presumption underlying
the ASY approach is correct, then there should be a single dominant princi-
pal component in the reduced form errors that we get from the estimation of
the VAR. Furthermore, this principal component should be highly correlated
with innovations in the ∆y-equation of our model but virtually uncorrelated
with innovations in the other two equations.
In table 3, we give the share of the total variation in [∆y;∆y¡∆inc;∆inc¡
∆c] that is explained by the ﬁrst principal component of Ω. As it turns out,
we do ﬁnd a dominant principal component in the reduced-form errors for
all groupings of countries and U.S. states that we examine. We then also
calculated the correlation of this principal component with unexpected inno-
vations in the ∆y-equation, i.e. "1ti as well as the ∆y¡∆inc- and ∆inc¡∆c-
equations, "i2t and "i3t respectively. These correlations are given in columns
2-4 of table 3. Our results suggest that, indeed, shocks to ∆y drive the joint
dynamics of [∆y;∆y ¡ ∆inc;∆inc ¡ ∆c]. This is an independent ﬁnding of
this paper that is nonetheless very important as it underscores the overall
validity of our method and the static version of it that has been proposed
in ASY (1996) and SY (1998), and that has also been applied in M´ elitz and
Zumer (1999).
Table 3: Share of ﬁrst principal component and correlation with
GDP shocks
Variance Correl. of 1st PC with
expl. by 1st PC ²i1t ²i2t ²i3t
OECD 87.48% 0.98 0.18 0.00
OECD core 90.27% 0.98 0.27 0.04
G7 90.71% 0.98 0.18 0.03
EU15 70.62% 0.97 0.21 0.01
EMU11 72.18% 0.97 0.26 0.01
U.S. states 66.07% 0.74 0.66 0.12
Source: OECD National Accounts Main Aggregates volume 1, OECD Economic Outlook,
period 1960-1996. ‘OECD’ refers to all 1996 members except Mexico and Turkey. ‘OECD
core’ denotes the G7 plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.
‘EU15’ refers to all 15 EU members as of 1996. ‘EMU 11’ comprises the eleven starting
members of EMU.
204.3 Permanent and transitory shocks
As we have argued earlier, there is a conceptual diﬀerence between perma-
nent and transitory variation in relative output levels: insurance against
permanent shocks requires the use of state-contingent assets. Conversely,
transitory shocks can be completely smoothed through credit markets. Ta-
ble 4 presents one of the central results of this paper: the dynamic risk
sharing proﬁles by source of uncertainty, i.e. for permanent (f¯P(k)gk=1;2:::)
and transitory shocks (f¯T(k)gk=1;2:::). These are calculated based on (10)
and (15). The table also gives the share of transitory shocks in the variation
of relative output levels. As becomes apparent, transitory shocks account
for 10-40 percent of output ﬂuctuations at business cycle frequencies, i.e. at
horizons between one and ﬁve years and depending on the country or regional
grouping.
The most important feature of the results in table 4 is that insurance
against transitory variation in relative output appears quite complete, al-
though the standard errors are at times relatively large for ¯T
C. Conversely,
both OECD countries and U.S. federal states are incompletely insured against
permanent shocks. But while U.S. federal states still share about half of their
permanent idiosyncratic risk, OECD countries share virtually none of it. This
implies that the apparent lack of international risk sharing gets worse in the
long run. We discuss this issue in more detail in the next section.
At the international level the ex post channel plays a relatively small but
always signiﬁcant role for insurance against permanent shocks. While this
role declines over time, it can be quite important in the short run.
We suggest two interpretations of this ﬁnding: the ﬁrst is that perma-
nent shocks trigger gradual responses in relative outputs. If output does not
reach its new permanent level instantaneously but only after an adjustment
period, this provides scope for optimal consumption smoothing behaviour.
The coeﬃcient ¯P
C can even become negative if the output response to a
positive permanent shock is monotonically increasing, and if that permanent
shock has a permanent impact on relative income (since it is not diversiﬁed
ex ante). Then, current consumption should adjust instantaneously to the
new permanent level whereas income, following the path of relative outputs,
will only adjust gradually. Hence, it is optimal to temporarily reduce savings
(i.e. the diﬀerence between income and consumption) in the face of positive
permanent shocks. This may explain the de-smoothing eﬀect that we ﬁnd for
the EU15 and the EMU11 and that is reﬂected in the negative coeﬃcients

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23The same logic can also rationalize a positive coeﬃcient of smoothing
if permanent shocks trigger a non-monotonic impulse response of output:
if income temporarily overshoots its new long-run level then it is optimal
for the country to adjust consumption incompletely, leading to a change in
savings that comoves positively with changes in output.
A second possible explanation why the ex post channel can play a role in
insuring countries against permanent shocks is that the diﬀerence between
income and consumption not only reﬂects borrowing and lending but more
generally, the purchase and sale of ﬁnancial assets. Also, consumption can
deviate from permanent income if discounted income streams are not the
only component of wealth. A country or region could be very well diversiﬁed
ex ante but its income may still move very closely with its output because the
country does not reap capital income ﬂows but rather realises capital gains
from foreign portfolio holdings. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) ﬁnd that
capital gains and other wealth eﬀects play an important role in international
risk sharing. In our metric, this would imply that very little ex ante risk
sharing is detected.20
While U.S. federal states insure a lot better against permanent shocks
than do countries, our ﬁndings for transitory variation in relative output
levels are surprisingly similar across data sets. In most country groups and
also among U.S. states, we ﬁnd that transitory shocks are insured virtually
completely. Most of the insurance against transitory variation is achieved
ex post and the relative role of the channels does not ﬂuctuate over time.
Sometimes, the results for the intertemporal channel would even suggest that
there is oversmoothing of consumption in response to transitory shocks, i.e.
in particular the coeﬃcients of ¯T
C(k) are found to be higher than unity. While
this feature is not generally very signiﬁcant, it is particularly pronounced in
the United States data. We note that our consumption data for the U.S. is
based on retail sales. A number of authors, including ASY acknowledge that
these data are very noisy and this noise is likely to show up in our transitory
component and we would therefore not overemphasize this result.
20In this respect, the association of cross-sectional and inter-temporal risk sharing with
the ex post and ex ante channel would seem imperfect. But note that, while trade in
equity and the realization of capital gains are the result of an ex ante optimization about
the allocation of risk, the transaction only take place after the resolution of uncertainty,
i.e. ex post.
245 Discussion and Conclusion
Our ﬁndings from the dynamic speciﬁcation are in line with the results from
the static regressions in table 1 and the ﬁndings in ASY (1996) and SY
(1998) who document that insurance among U.S. states is more complete
mainly because there is more ex ante insurance. Indeed, they suggest that the
stylized fact that consumption insurance between countries is less complete
than within them is largely a failure of world ﬁnancial markets to provide
insurance against permanent output shocks.21 U.S. federal states achieve
better insurance against permanent shocks because they insure better ex
ante. Since insurance ex ante is the only way in which a country can shield
its consumption from permanent asymmetric variation, this implies that the
lack of international consumption risk sharing (as gauged against evidence
from regional data) is even worse in the long run.
Our results shed important light on the nature of the frictions that are
responsible for the lack of international consumption risk sharing: by and
large we ﬁnd that all transitory shocks are insured while insurance against
permanent variation is very incomplete. At the same time, the potential
welfare gains from better insurance against permanent variation in relative
outputs dwarf those that can be reaped from insurance against risks at the
business cycle frequency.22
To the extent that rational agents will buy exactly that amount of insur-
ance that equates marginal costs and beneﬁts, this suggests that the marginal
cost of insuring against permanent risk is much higher than that of insuring
against transitory risk. In particular, this ﬁnding rules out any explana-
tion of the lack of international consumption risk sharing that is based on
transaction costs:
Recall that insurance against permanent shocks requires the use of state-
contingent assets, whereas transitory shocks can be smoothed with bonds and
loans alone. Fixed transaction costs such as language barriers, institutional
and regulatory diﬀerences but also the cost of collecting information would
therefore have to vary widely across asset classes in order to explain our
ﬁndings. We do not think that this is the case.
It could, however, still be the case that higher variable transaction costs
(such as trading costs that are often volume dependent) for state-contingent
assets might explain diﬀerential degrees of risk sharing for permanent and
21This ﬁnding is in line with earlier results in Canova and Ravn (1996) who also found
that in international data low-frequency risks seem to be insured less than high frequency
ﬂuctuations.
22See e.g. the calculations in van Wincoop (1999) and compare also the calculations in
Lucas (1987).
25transitory shocks. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is a lot of
trade in international equity markets and that gross capital ﬂows are big in re-
lation to net ﬂows (see e.g. Golub (1990)) and that turnover in international
equity portfolios is high. Tesar and Werner (1995) note that low net inter-
national investment positions come along with a high volume of cross-border
capital ﬂows and a high turnover rate on foreign equity investments relative
to turnover on domestic equity markets. Actually, the turnover rate on in-
ternational equity investments is high both when compared to the turnover
rate in the investor’s country of origin, and when compared to the market
of origination of the foreign security. Against the backdrop of this evidence,
variable transactions costs are an unlikely explanation for the diﬀerential
degrees of risk sharing for permanent and transitory shocks.
Our ﬁndings rather point us towards particular forms of market incom-
pleteness (which could of course be interpreted as prohibitive ﬁxed cost of
investment) as the more likely explanation of the home bias and the observed
diﬀerential degrees of risk sharing for permanent and transitory shocks.
Kehoe and Perri (2002) have suggested that international ﬁnancial mar-
kets could be endogenously incomplete because contracts could be less en-
forceable between countries than between regions. Our results would support
this explanation but they also suggest that while markets may be more com-
plete within countries than between them, they are still clearly incomplete
even within countries (note that 40 percent of permanent idiosyncratic out-
put variability remains uninsured even in U.S. data).
Our results also tie in with other ﬁndings from recent empirical and the-
oretical research. Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) ﬁnd that the
international component of most countries’ portfolios is heavily biased to-
wards loans and bonds. On the theoretical side, Baxter and Crucini (1995)
have shown that the full risk sharing allocations that ensue as equilibria in
models with complete markets can be approximated by models that feature
only non-state-contingent assets - as long as shocks are not too persistent.
Plausibly, the fact that insurance against permanent shocks is incomplete
while transitory shocks get smoothed almost completely (and mainly ex post)
could be explained by the ﬁndings in these papers.
5.1 Summary
Our aim in this paper was to draw a map of an area of our ignorance, i.e.
how countries share risks at various time horizons. In so doing, we have
expanded the set of stylized facts provided in ASY (1996) and SY (1998)
along several important dimensions. As we have shown, considering the
structure of dynamic risk sharing at diﬀerent horizons can provide important
26insights into the possible sources of the home bias. While this paper has
not set out to test one particular explanation of the lack of international
consumption risk sharing, our results establish some stylized facts that can
serve as a benchmark for theoretical models:
1. U.S. federal states share roughly one half of their idiosyncratic risk ex
ante, whereas there is virtually no ex ante insurance at the international
level. The contribution of the ex ante channel is roughly constant over
time in both data sets. Also, the amount of ex post risk sharing achieved
is about the same in both data sets but declines from about 30 to 50
percent in the short run to generally less than ten percent in the long
run. Taken together, these ﬁndings imply that the lack of international
consumption risk sharing worsens in the long run.
2. The lack of international consumption insurance is in fact a failure to
insure against permanent ﬂuctuations whereas insurance against tran-
sitory shocks seems almost complete. This ﬁnding allows us to rule out
transaction costs based explanations of the home bias and points us to-
wards endogenous market incompleteness that makes insuring against
permanent shocks almost prohibitively expensive at the international
level.
3. An additional and unrelated contribution of this paper was to provide
evidence based on principal components analysis that shows that shocks
to output are the predominant source of variability in standard data
sets. This documents the empirical validity of risk sharing regressions
in the spirit of ASY both in static and dynamic settings.
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30Data Appendix
International Data
The data are from OECD National Accounts Main Aggregates volume 1,
OECD Economic Outlook, period 1960-1996. The OECD countries in our
sample consist of all 1996 members except Mexico and Turkey. A special case
is Germany due to German uniﬁcation: The data contain a consistent series
for ‘West Germany’ from 1960 through 1994, and a series for the uniﬁed
Germany from 1990 through 1996.
We also consider several subsets of countries: ‘OECD’ refers to all 1996
members of the OECD except Mexico and Turkey, while ‘OECD core’ denotes
the G7 plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.
‘EU15’ refers to all 15 EU members as of 1996. ‘EMU 11’ comprises the
eleven starting members of EMU.
Gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP) and house-
hold ﬁnal consumption expenditure (C) are all deﬂated using the consumer
price index (obtained by dividing series for private ﬁnal consumption expendi-
ture in current prices by the series for private ﬁnal consumption expenditure
in 1990 prices). Population data are mid-year estimates. Exchange Rates
data are market rates averaged over each year. Exchange rates for Germany
refer to the Deutsche Mark.
Intranational Data
The U.S. regional data are the data used in ASY and were downloaded
from Oved Yosha’s webpage. They consist of gross-state product and per-
sonal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and range
from 1963-1990. Personal consumption data at the state level is not avail-
able. ASY have therefore used retail sales data. Unfortunately, retail sales
are only a part of total personal consumption, so in order to obtain an es-
timate of total personal consumption. ASY re-scaled the retail sales data
by the ratio of aggregate U.S. private consumption to aggregate U.S. retail




Here, we show why the relative variance contributions of permanent
and transitory shocks are independent of how the permanent and transitory
shocks are identiﬁed among themselves.
Assume that S¼ and S¿ are appropriately dimensioned non-singular ma-
trices such that ¼0 = S¼¼ and ¿0 = S¿¿. Recall that the coeﬃcients of
the reduced-form moving average representation of ∆Xt are given by C(L).









is just the matrix mapping the reduced-form disturbances into their perma-
nent and transitory components.





























































































32are the mean squared prediction errors associated with the permanent
and transitory shocks.
Panel VAR estimation
In a landmark paper, Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) - HNR for
short - explained how to estimate VARs in a panel framework. Here, we dis-
cuss our implementation of their method for the cointegrated VAR. We start




Γl∆Xi;t¡l+°Zit¡1+fi+¸t+uit i = 1;:::;K;t = p+1;:::;T
(19)
where Zit¡1 = ±0Xt¡1 is the error-correction term and p is the lag order of
the level VAR. Now, all variables vary by i and t. fi is the vector of country-
speciﬁc eﬀects and ¸t are time-speciﬁc eﬀect. As described in the main
text, we already capture time-speciﬁc eﬀects by subtracting the population-
weighted OECD or US-wide average, i.e. all elements of Xit are in relative
form. We will therefore neglect time speciﬁc eﬀects in our exposition.
However, estimation of (19) brings up a new econometric problem: since
∆Xit is a function of fi, ∆Xi;t¡1 is also a function of fi. Therefore, ∆Xi;t¡1,
a right-hand regressor in (19), is correlated with the error term. This ren-
ders the simple OLS estimator of (19) biased and inconsistent even if the
uit are not serially correlated. For the standard ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estima-
tor, the ‘within’ transformation wipes out the country-speciﬁc eﬀects fi, but
(∆Xi;t¡1 ¡ ∆Xi;:¡1) where ∆Xi;:¡1 =
PT
t=2 ∆Xi;t¡1=(T ¡ 1) will still be
correlated with (ui;t ¡ui;:) even if the uit are not serially correlated. This is
because ui;: contains ui;t¡1 which is correlated with ∆Xi;t¡1 by construction.
The speciﬁcation of (19) as a projection implies that the error term uit





iuit] s < t (20)
We can exploit these orthogonality conditions to identify the parameters
of the model. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences on (19), we obtain
∆Xit ¡ ∆Xit¡1 =
p¡1 X
l=1
Γl(∆Xi;t¡l ¡ ∆Xi;t¡l¡1) + ° (Zit¡1 ¡ Zit¡2) + vit
i = 1;:::;K;t = p + 2;:::;T (21)
33where
vit = uit ¡ ui;t¡1 (22)
The orthogonality conditions of equation (20) imply that the error term























qualify as instrumental variables. The original parameters are identiﬁed if
T ¸ p+3.23 Note that the number of instruments increases with t. Thus, the
HNR estimator is more eﬃcient than an IV estimator based on once-lagged
endogenous variables alone (as in Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).
Estimation yields the coeﬃcients [Γ1;:::;Γp¡1;°], and we can calculate the
variance-covariance matrix Ω¤ of the transformed system. Using (22), we are
able to recover the variance-covariance matrix of the original system. The
estimated coeﬃcients[Γ1;:::;Γp¡1;°] can then be used to obtain the coeﬃcient
matrices Cl of the moving average representation. Finally, we can compute
the mean squared prediction error using (9) from which the results in the
main text follow immediately.














as instruments in which case we
also gain one more period for estimation because in this case identiﬁcation only requires
T ¸ p + 2. The results, however are very similar which we consider a robustness check of
our empirical strategy.
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